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THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE OVER THE PROTECTION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RAFIKBAWAt

The conflict over intellectual property in the international context takes place
in a tense environment of change. It is shaped by economic, political social
and philosophical dimensions which exemplify the sharp contrast of opinions
between developed, industrial countries and less developed countries. This
article argues that the solution to this debate, as it is most commonly defined,
is unfeasible. In redefining the solution, the author constructs a criteria for
compromise: instead offocusing on the implementation ofa universal standard
ofprotection, an individually-tailored framework suited to a nations stage of
development is proposed.
Le confiit concernant la proprihe intellectuelle dans le context international
se deroule dans un environnement inconstant. Il est forme par des facteurs
economiques, politiques et sociaux/ philosophiques qui soutendent les
divergences d'opinions importantes entre les pays developpes, les pays
industriels et les pays moins developpes. L 'auteur soutient que la solution a ce
debat, comme elle est generalement difinie, est impraticable. L 'auteur,
propose de redifinir la solution, selon le critere suivant pour arriver a un
compromis. Au lieu de se concentrer sur la mise en oeuvre d'un systeme de
protection avec des standards uniformes pour tout les pays, il propose une
mhhode d'analyse fondee sur un cadre adapte selon l'hape de
developpement dans lequel chaque pays se retrouve.

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of intellectual property protection, a traditionally
domestic economic policy issue, has always included an
international dimension. In recent years, this international
dimension has become more pronounced. Consequently, its
political, philosophical, and even social significance in the
international arena has been the subject of much controversy,
particularly between developed and less developed countries. The
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North-South 1 debate is defined as follows: it is the North's
predominant contention that a uniform standard of intellectual
property protection will be of benefit to all countries. Developed
countries point to the incentive effects of intellectual property
protection on innovative activity and the importance of such
incentives to the development needs of the South. In contrast, the
South, or less developed countries, reject these arguments,
emphasizing their special circumstances and requirements which are
essential to progress along the road to development. They are
skeptical of the somewhat unfounded claims of the North and note
that lower standards of protection are economically efficient from a
developing country's perspective.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it will attempt to
identify the forces which are at play in the North-South debate by
advancing the interests of each side. Second, it will question
whether a resolution to the debate, within the parameters of this
discussion, is at all feasible.
In Part I, the analysis begins with some essential background.
Intellectual property is defined, and the parties to the debate are
more clearly introduced. Next, the global developments which have
made the international dimension of intellectual property more
significant and have given rise to the debate itself are explained.
The analysis continues as the various interests of the parties are
presented in a format which dearly highlights the forces that both
define and shape the debate. It is the author's contention that the
conflict over intellectual property protection in the international
context has, to date, progressed in a tense environment for change.
This environment is characterized by an economic, political,
philosophical and social dimension. Each of these dimensions, and

1 The terms North/South, developed/developing/less developed are used
interchangeably. The term "North" refers to developed countries. The term
"South" refers to less developed countries, which are also from time to time
referred to as developing countries, although the latter terms is less accurate. Less
developed countries, abbreviated "Loe" throughout this paper, include countries
traditionally considered developing or underdeveloped, but also include countries
which are today more precisely referred to as newly industrialized countries. At
some points in the analysis, the issue being considered may in fact be more relevant
to one subset of LDCs than the other. However, the term LDC is used for purposes of
convenience throughout Part I. The distinction is nevertheless significant, as will
become apparent in Part II of the paper.
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the conflicting perspectives of the North and South within them,
are examined respectively. Because the format of this examination
is inherently general, a closer and more detailed consideration of
each side's perspective follows.
Part II of the paper engages in a more remedial analysis. In
concluding that a solution to the debate, as defined, is not feasible,
it seeks to propose another, more useful solution. The author
proposes that a solution should focus not on the implementation of
a universal standard of protection, but on the implementation of
individually tailored levels of protection suited to a nation's stage of
development. Such a framework is assessed in terms of its
compatibility with the existing institutional structures of the World
Trade Organization (wTo). In this context, it is submitted that an
effective and efficient solution to the debate is indeed feasible.

II.BACKGROUND
1. What is Intellectual Property?

Before embarking on an examination of the conflicting agendas of
the North and South, it is critical to understand what is meant by
the term intellectual property (rP ) 2 itself. There are two types of
property: tangible and intangible. Laws relating to tangible property
refer to rights that are attached to or flow from a physical object.3
Laws relating to intellectual property, in contrast, refer to rights
attached to or flowing from intangible property, including ideas,
inventions, and creative expressions of the mind, broadly defined. 4
IP creates the property by defining what will be protected from
others. Its delineation of rights reflects policy choices, defining
what types of intellectual activities are valued and, therefore, are
worthy of protection. 5 It is important to note at this early stage of
the analysis, that the bestowing of the status of 'property' upon such

2 The abbreviation IP is used throughout this paper to refer to intellectual
property for purposes of convenience and brevity.
3 D.A.Gregory et al., Introduction to Intellectual Property Law (Washington:
BNA Books, 1994).
4 R.W. Eberschlag, Intellectual Property Rights, Developing Countries and the
Uruguay Round Negotiations (M.A. Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1994) at 4.
5 Gregory, supra note 3.
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intangibles was primarily a conception formulated and first
accepted by the developed world. These mechanisms, or regimes of
intellectual property, have been cultivated by developed countries
largely to accommodate their interests; interests which, as will be
examined within the scope of this paper, are often in conflict with
those ofless developed countries (LDcs).
There are a number of regimes of intellectual property. For the
purposes of this paper, two are particularly relevant and will be
defined here. Patents are designed to protect the right to make,
use, or sell an original invention. Patent law is particularly relevant
in the context of technology because technology inevitably plays a
critical role in the development of new inventions. Copyrights
protect the right to publish, copy, or sell original literary, musical,
artistic, photographic, or other expressions of thought. In the
international realm, and particularly with regard to the NorthSouth debate, copyright law plays a significant role in the context
of culture and education. However, the impact of technology on
copyright law cannot be overlooked. More recently, the regime of
copyright has been used to protect innovations of the computer age,
particularly software. 6 Clearly its role is expanding from culture and
education to technology, and this presents a controversy that runs
parallel to the debate over IP protection in the international arena.
To date, this parallel controversy has been predominantly engaged
within the borders of the developed countries. Its impact on the
international controversy over IP protection, however, continues to
grow steadily. 7

6

There is some controversy whether patent or copyright is a more effective
regime to protect software. It is also important to recognize that the protection of
software is but one area of controversy. The Internet, and the inevitable global
access to information that it permits, is another concept that has the potential to
expand the scope of copyright.
7 R.M. Gadbaw & T. ]. Richards, Intellectual Property Rights: Global Consensus,
Global Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1988). u.s. efforts in persuading
Argentina to adapt its copyright laws to include software should not face the
obstacles that exist, for example, in persuading it to include patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. This is because, to date, while unauthorized copying is extensive,
there is no significant organized group which opposes copyright protection for
software in Argentina. At the same time, representatives of software creators (both
Argentine and others) have not yet established a specific unified position in support
of copyright protection for their works. Undoubtedly, as international piracy in
software increases, the conflicting interests will become more pronounced and the
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2. Who are the Parties to the Conflict?

The debate over IP protection, for the purposes of this paper, is one
that takes place between developed countries and less developed
countries (LDcs). Such a statement, however, may suggest a
uniformity among parties comprising one side or another that does
not exist. While a number of developed countries may benefit from
and do support increased levels of IP protection, it would not be
fair, or for that matter accurate, to suggest that all developed
countries, as a group, are equally supportive and equally determined
to establish a uniform standard of protection. The extent of a
country's comparative advantage in innovation, as opposed to
imitation or adaptation of the innovations of others, is what shapes
its strategy toward IP. 8
For example, Canada is often considered to be a net importer
of innovation. While innovations are not imitated or copied in an
unauthorized manner, Canadians are known for their aptitude for
adapting and modifying existing technology in a manner which
complies with accepted levels of IP protection. 9 Consequently, while
Canada would benefit to some extent from the application of
uniform standards worldwide, it is has less to lose from inadequate
protections than many LDCs. 10
In fact, lower universal standards of protection could arguably
benefit Canada in that the advantage of cheaper access to foreign
information may actually outweigh any losses of foregone revenues
due to piracy and inadequate protection of Canadian innovations.
The United States, in contrast, is the world's leader in innovation. It
role of copyright as a protection mechanism for software and other 'inventions' of
the computer age will face the pressures of change in the international arena.
8 M. J. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (New
York: Routledge, 1995).
9 Economic Council of Canada, Report on Intellectual and Industrial Property
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971). Canada is seen as a net importer of innovation in
relation to intellectual property protected by both patent and copyright regimes.
The Economic Council of Canada notes that ninety-five percent of patents granted
within Canada go to foreigners, predominantly from the u.s. In addition, the
Council suggests that Canada's balance of international payments for information
protected by copyright is likely to always be heavily outbound. The maintenance of
good access to foreign information is critical for Canada. The Council
recommends that these considerations should be kept clearly in mind for purposes
of international negotiation.
10 Ibid.
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is not unreasonable, therefore, that the u.s. has been the most
aggressive developed country in the movement toward the
adoption of a universal standard of IP protection. To a large extent,
the efforts of the u.s. have been readily supported by Japan and
members of the European Union. 11
Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that when the
term "developed country" is used, it most often represents the
activities or beliefs of those countries which have more at stake
because of the existence of a comparative advantage in innovation.
More often than not, the term is used almost exclusively to refer to
the U.S ..
The term "less developed country" refers to a group of
countries which have not yet reached the level of economic welfare
and industrial capacity of the developed countries. However, the
term is wide-sweeping. It includes countries traditionally
considered "developing" or "underdeveloped," such as those of
Sub-Saharan Africa and many of the countries of Latin America. It
also includes countries which, while once considered to be in the
process of developing, are now more accurately termed "newly
industrialized countries." 12 These countries, which include Taiwan,
Korea, Malaysia, and a host of others are important contributors to
the debate. Indeed it is their stories of success and failure which, as
will be seen in the course of this analysis, set the stage for a
prospective solution to the debate.

III. THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT SET THE
BACKDROP FOR CHANGE

The movement toward a more viable standard of IP protection in
the international arena was initiated and, in fact, provided with
additional momentum by various global developments. These
developments have revolutionized the world trading system and
have set the stage for the environment in which the IP debate is
held.

Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 7.
D. Brenner-Beck, "Do as I Say, Not as I Did" (1992) 11 U.C.L.A. Pac. Basin
L.J. 84 at 89.
JI

12
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1. Growth in the Significance of Economic Interdependence

This century has witnessed a dramatic increase in the relative
importance of international trade to the economic stability of a
country. The increasing importance is due in part to changes in
technology which facilitate not only greater quantities of trade, but
also greater efficiency in the functioning of the global trading
system. Faster and more efficient transportation and
communication mechanisms have allowed local economies to
extend themselves into the international realm of commerce in the
fashion of what has been termed "economic globalization." 13 This
trend is accompanied by increased reliance among nations on
trading policies of other countries and, in turn, a consequent
reduction of orthodox trade barriers between countries. 14 The
debate over protection of intellectual property rights in this
international arena is but one example of the extent of this
interdependence. The absence of many trade barriers has made
intellectual property more visible in relative terms. Some intellectual
property products (computer software, for example) which
formerly might have been precluded from entering a market by
tariffs or quotas may still face a barrier to market access in the form
of weak intellectual property rights protection. 15 Developed
countries contend that the lack of protection existing in many LDCS
destabilizes the international trading system. It allows LDCS to gain
significant trade advantages because it allows them to appropriate
intellectual property and make a profit from the sale of counterfeit
products both domestically and in the international market. Their
profit is at the expense of developed countries who rely on sales of
the originals in these same markets to maintain their trade balances.
The result is an unintended transfer of wealth from the economies
of the industrialized countries to those of the developing
countries. 16

I3
14

See e.g. Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8.
See e.g. Eberschlag, supra note 4 at 13.

15

Ibid
D. Tussie, The Less Developed Countries and the World Trading System (New

16

York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1987).
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2. Growth in the Significance of Technology and Innovation to
Industry
The technology and innovation component of exports, both
tangible and intangible, has grown significantly during the course of
this century. The export of products in the u.s. considered to have a
high degree of IP content rose from ten percent of all exports in
1960 to twenty-five percent in 1988.17 Innovation has, in fact,
become the hallmark of the economies of the OECD countries.
Robert Eberschlag notes:
Comparative advantage, export success, and international
competitiveness are no longer understood as simply
resulting from plentiful resource endowments or low
labour costs, but instead are created through the
development and clever employment of technology. 18

Developed countries typically devote one percent to three percent
of their annual GNP to the research and development needed to
produce new technologies. 19 "Estimates suggest that forty percent
of the growth in per capita GNP in the u.s. from 1929 to 1957 is
due to technological change. " 20 It is no wonder that developed
countries place importance on the need for increased IP protection
worldwide.
The growth in the significance of technology has influenced
LD cs in a different manner. While imports have higher
technological content, many LDCs have not witnessed a comparable
increase in the significance of technology to their own domestic
industries as a result of domestic research and development.
According to a study conducted by Dru Brenner-Beck, inventions
by LDCS accounted for only 1.8 per cent of the world patent stock

Eberschlag, supra note 4 at 11.
Ibid. at 11.
l9 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 87. See also A. Mody, "New International
Environment for Intellectual Property Rights" in F. Rushing & C. Ganz Brown,
eds., Intellectual Property Rights in Science, Technology, and Economic Peformance at
203, 207.
20 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 87. See also E. Mansfield, "Intellectual
Property, Technology and Economic Growth," in Rushing & Ganz Brown, eds.,
supra note 19 at 17, 19.
l7

18
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in 1988. 21 However, the significance of technology has not gone
unnoticed. By recognizing improved production processes and new
products which technology and innovation give rise to, it is clear
that LDCS have appropriated developed world technology and
innovation to improve their own trade status. This is essentially
what gives rise to what has been defined as another development
that has led the IP movement: growth in the significance of piratical
industries.

3. Growth in the Significance of Piratical Industries
In some LDCs, entire industries have developed that owe their very
existence to the ability to pirate. Recognizing that a strong demand
for goods with high technological or innovative content exists both
within their own domestic markets and outside their borders, many
LDCs have engaged in the unauthorized and uncompensated
reproduction of products with IP content. Such appropriation has
been facilitated by technologies which themselves aid in the
reproduction process. Intellectual property can be transferred more
efficiently today by means of modem, Internet, cable, satellite, and
fax. Copyrighted material can be replicated by way of high-speed
photocopiers and scanners. 22 The result has been the emergence of
an international market for counterfeit and pirated goods operating
parallel to and in competition with the legitimate market for these
goods.
The impact of piracy on countries in which the original
products were developed can be substantial. Injury may occur in
one of three ways. 23 The first is through import underpricing in the
counterfeiting country's market. An LDC which produces
unauthorized reproductions of foreign products may price them
lower than the originals and thus make it more difficult for the
original product to compete in the LDc's domestic market. The
second form of injury is by way of re-exportation of unauthorized
products to other foreign markets. The LDC may introduce the

21 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 97, 98. Calculations are based on WIPO,
Industrial Property Statistics (1988), excluding Eastern European countries, the
USSR, and South Africa.
22 Eberschlag, supra note 4 at 12.
23 J. H. Reichman, "Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities
and Risks of a GAIT Connection" (1989) 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 747.
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copies into the stream of international trade and thereby compete
on more favorable terms with exporters in the international arena
who sell the genuine articles at higher prices. Finally, injury may
occur by way of re-exportation of unauthorized products to the
originator's home market. In this context, an LDC essentially reintroduces the product, in its copied form, into the originating
country's market at a price that substantially undercuts the
originator on its own territory.
In 1988, the u.s. International Trade Commission (usITc)
conducted an extensive study and prepared a report on the impact
of piracy on u.s. business. 24 Its conclusions are startling. Total u.s.
business losses due to piracy in 1986 were estimated at $23.8
billion, 2 5 or fifteen percent of the u.s. trade deficit. 26 Employment
losses attributable to foreign piracy have been estimated to be
approximately 131,000 jobs.27 The study identified twelve
countries in which losses from piracy amounted to $1.3 billion per
year in lost sales revenue alone. 28 From an international perspective,
another study has estimated that global losses from piracy may
account for as much as five percent of world trade. 29 One should be
cautious of such figures, however, as they are often based on the
estimates of sales that would have occurred if consumers had
purchased the more expensive legitimate goods; goods they might
not have so purchased because they are more expensive. 30

24 u.s. International Trade Commission Study, "Foreign Protection of
Intellectual Property and the Effect on u.s. Industry and Trade" (1988) [hereinafter
usrTc Study] as cited in Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 86.
2 5 Ibid. at 88.
26 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 89. See also E. A. Finn Jr. "That's the $60
Billion Question," Forbes (17 Nov. 1986) 40.
27 Ibid. See G. M. Hoffman, "The Annenberg Washington Program, Curbing
International Piracy of Intellectual Property: Policy Options for a Major
Exporting Country" (1989).
28 The countries identified were Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
2 9 "Pirates Bag a Deadly Haul" The [London} Daily Telegraph (5 September
1990) 27.
30 See USITC Study, supra note 24. The methodology employed by the usrTc study
consisted of sending questionnaires to companies in affected industries asking them
to estimate their losses due to piracy. Self-interest may have resulted in
overestimation (at 89).
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N. A TENSE ENVIRONMENT FOR CHANGE

1. The Forces Which Define and Shape the Debate
i. The Economic Dimension

Before addressing the economic dimension of the IP protection
debate in the international context, it is useful to consider the
economic arguments as they exist in the domestic context. The
basic economic argument for the protection of IP is that unless
invention or creation is compensated at its full social value there will
be a lack of incentive to undertake it. 31 A useful example is
provided by the pharmaceutical industry where pharmaceutical
companies may spend millions of dollars in research and
development to create a single drug. It is through the sale of this
drug that they are able to recoup their development costs. Without
patent protection, the production processes of the company would
be at the disposal of any other company wishing to manufacture the
new drug. Consequently, the appropriating firm would be able to
sell the drug at a lower price since it does not face the burden of
recouping development costs. It is therefore able to effectively
undercut the firm which originates the drug. The result is a "freerider" problem, where an individual or firm is less likely to make an
investment in research and development, or any innovative activity
for that matter, if the results of such activities can be appropriated
at little or no cost.3 2
Intellectual property protection is accorded economic
justification in that it stimulates innovative activity.3 3 But the
benefits of providing an incentive to innovation must be balanced
against the potential cost associated with the creation of a
monopoly on knowledge. If a single firm is provided with the
opportunity to reap profits from a product it has developed,
competitors who may be able to imitate or adapt the invention such
that its social value is increased are effectively excluded. Without
competitors, the cost of the product may also be much higher. The
debate is intensified when the product in question provides a social
benefit, as for example a pharmaceutical product. In such a case, an

3I
32
33

See e.g. Gregory, supra note 3 at 1.

Jbid.
Ibid.
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argument may be added that the benefit of the product to society
at large resulting from a less restrictive IP regime outweighs the
benefit of providing an incentive to innovate (the flip side of this, of
course, is that without protective measures the innovation would
not have occurred in the first place). In the domestic economic
environment, the costs and benefits must be weighed and a scheme
of intellectual property protection developed for the country which
best facilitates a compromise between these competing interests.
The standard economic analysis for intellectual property
protection, as outlined above, assumes a dosed economy. When the
same analysis is applied in the international arena, a substantially
altered compromise may be required. The same economic interests
are at stake; incentives to innovate must be balanced against the
potential to free ride. The players, however, must be considered
from a broader perspective. In this context, it is the LDCs which are
the free riders and the developed countries which are the potential
monopoly holders.
It has been argued, however, that in the international version of
this analysis another interest comes into play: that of comparative
advantage.3 4 As net importers of innovation, LDCs have a
comparative advantage in imitating the innovations of other
countries. Innovation is not a major source of economic activity in
these countries and it is wise, from an economic perspective, for an
LDC to choose a less stringent intellectual property regime than a
country whose economy is highly dependent on innovation. Many
developed countries, in contrast, have traditionally had a
comparative advantage in innovation. Under such circumstances, a
high level of protection for intellectual property rights would seem
well justified.35
The parameters of this analysis lie in the costs and benefits as
they accrue in the global environment, and the interests of all
countries must be considered. Developed countries which are net
exporters of innovation often argue that the benefits of increased IP
protection accrue not only to developed countries, but to LDCs as
well. Developed countries base their argument on the increased
potential for foreign technology transfers and the incentive to local
innovation that results from IP protection. These arguments are

34

Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8.

35

Ibid.
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rejected by the LDCs who foresee bleak consequences from increased
protection. Both perspectives are considered in sufficiently more
detail in a later section of this paper. However, even before the
details of these conflicting perspectives are examined, it becomes
apparent that the debate over the international protection of IP is
not likely to be resolved by a pareto efficient3 6 compromise.
Essentially, it would be overly optimistic to assume that a possible
solution could implement a universal standard of protection in
which every country involved will benefit. Instead, the debate will
be resolved, if at all, by way of a compromise that is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient, 37 where the gains in economic welfare attributed to the
benefits of a universally accepted standard will be seen as
outweighing losses in welfare that result from its costs. 38

zz. The Political Dimension
a. The Attempt of Developed Nations to Retain Significant
Comparative Advantage in Intellectual Production
Studies suggest that the prospects for the industrialized
countries to retain a major share of the global market in
the 21st century depends not only on their ability to
stimulate technological innovation, but also on efforts to

36

D.W. Pearce, ed., The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1992) at 324. "Pareto optimum" is defined as an allocation of resources
such that no reallocation can make anyone better off without making at least one
other person worse off.
37 Ibid. at 328. "Kaldor-Hicks" efficiency results in a situation where state A is
preferred to state B if those who gain from the move to A can compensate those who
lose and still be better off.
3 8 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8. Trebilcock and Howse suggest that the
level of protection chosen must be justified as a fair bargain or trade-off between the
competing or conflicting economic interests of different states (at 273). See also A.
Deardoff, "Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing Countries?"
(1990) 13 World Economy 497 at 505-506. Deardorff argues that global
aggregate welfare may well be maximized if certain countries are exempted
completely from requirements for intellectual property protection because, in some
poorer countries, the marginal increased rents to the patent holder are unlikely to
be substantial enough to create the incentive for further innovation. When
combined with the effect of a shift in productive resources to an area in which a
country does not have a comparative advantage, the net result is a reduction in
global allocative efficiency.
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ensure an orderly diffusion of that technology through
appropriate international legal machinery. 39

The preceding statement of J. H. Reichman 40 brings to light
another dimension of the debate over international IP protection. It
would be naive to assume that any "compromise" between
competing interests of the North and South would be reached
solely on the grounds of its economic merit from an international
point of view. An assumption of this nature fails to recognize the
influence that the economic strength of the North itself may be
able to wield upon the South. Political pressure to succumb to the
standards sought by countries which desire to increase IP protection
is clearly a motivating factor in the debate. It may indeed be
argued that the economic rhetoric used to affirm the position of the
developed countries is merely a guise for a strategy that is more
political in its intent. Professor Suman Naresh argues:
Attempting to persuade developing countries that the
industrialized countries are promoting enhanced
intellectual property protection to accelerate the former' s
economic growth is neither necessary nor appropriate at
this point. The IP debate stands on firmer ground if
premised on the recognition that the industrialized
countries are attempting to protect an increasingly
important component of their national wealth. 4I

As LDCs profit from improved manufacturing skills, the ability of
the developed countries to maintain healthy trade balances will
increasingly depend upon the export of goods with high intellectual
content, an area in which they retain a significant comparative
advantage. There are some, in fact, that take the extreme view that
the movement initiated by developed countries to establish a high
universal standard of IP protection is "an attempt to control the
diffusion of new technologies ... [and] to freeze the international

39

Reichman, supra note 23 at 754.

40

Ibid.

F.M. Abbott, "Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual
Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework (1989) 22 Vand.J.
Transnat'l L. 689 at 699.
4I
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division of labour" 42 by way of controlling technology transfers to
the Third World. While this may be an exaggerated claim, it is
nonetheless true that the future economic strength of developed
countries may be at stake if IP protection is not universally
accepted.

b. The Forum ofNegotiation: Linking IP to Trade
The political dimension of the IP debate is further exemplified in
the context of the controversy which exists between the North and
South regarding the forum in which the debate should be
addressed. The search for a uniform standard of protection led the
u.s. to look to GATT as a forum in which to address the issue of IP
protection in the international context. LDCs, in contrast, saw the
World Intellectual Property Organization (wIPO), which has the
status of a specialized agency of the UN, as the appropriate forum.43
For the u.s., as well as various other developed countries including
Japan and members of the European Union, GATT would allow the
IP issue to be strategically linked to trade. This would provide the
u.s. with a bargaining chip in that it would have a favourable
advantage in negotiating a higher, more universal standard of IP
protection. 44
The LDCS recognized that the existing international agreements
administered by WIPO, including the Paris Convention, the Berne
Convention and the ucc, did not link IP protection with trade, and
as such, removed the potential for any bargaining advantage that
the u.s. and other developed countries might have. 45 Until the

42 C. Braga, "The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A
View from the South" (1989) 22 Vand.J. Transnat'l L. 243 at 252. Braga notes that
this is the interpretation of some analysts, though not his own view.
4 3 H.P. Kunz-Hallstein, "The u.s. Proposal for a GATT Agreement on
Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property" (1989) 22 Vand.J. Transnat'l L 265. Note: the GATT is both an
international set of rules governing trade and an institution that administers those
rules and oversees multilateral trade negotiations. WIPO was organized in 1963 to
oversee several of the major international agreements on intellectual property
rights protection (including the Berne and Paris Conventions). One of WIPo's
missions is to promote the protection of intellectual property rights through
technical assistance and educational support.
44 Reichman, supra note 23.
45 Ibid
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Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT, international trade and
intellectual property had been relegated to distinct and separate
spheres. Reference to IP in the text of GATT was limited to a
provision permitting the adoption by individual GATT member
states of domestic legislation necessary to protect it. 46 In the mid1970s, private sector interest in the protection of IP at an
international level was initiated largely in recognition of the global
developments outlined earlier. Subsequent to the Uruguay Round,
it became apparent that the developed world, with the u.s. at the
forefront, was intent on an ambitious course to establish a set of
standards for the protection of IP that could be applied worldwide.
It also became apparent that the enforcement of this standard could
best be established by linking IP protection to trade by way of the
GATT. Consequently, the u.s. spearheaded the movement to have
intellectual property rights included as an integral part of the
Uruguay Round negotiations. Indeed the final act of the Uruguay
Round included an agreement on trade related aspects of
intellectual property (TRIPS). Clearly the position of the LDCs
changed, from strong opposition to acquiescence in the inclusion of
IP related issues in the negotiating agenda and, indeed, in the Final
Act. While perhaps not the sole instigator, it would be hard to deny
that the change in opinion, which effectively allowed IP to be linked
to trade, was attributed to unilateral pressure resulting from the
retaliatory trade legislation of the developed countries, especially
the u.s ..47

46 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8 at 254.
4 7 Eberschlag, supra note 4 at 30-37. Eberschlag

proposes two theories for the
resulting change of position of the developing countries on the inclusion of TRIPS in
the GATT. The first theory postulates that developing countries underwent a genuine
change of opinion on the benefits of a strong intellectual properry rights system; a
general shift by developing countries towards the market and away from state
control over the economy. The second theory ·attributes the change to bilateral
pressure resulting from u.s. trade legislation. Eberschlag concludes that the
developing countries did change their minds to some extent on the merits of
intellectual property protection, but clearly, their change of position was also
largely forced, or at least catalyzed, by bilateral pressure from the u.s. The position
taken by Eberschlag's thesis is that both explanations contribute significantly to an
understanding of the problem, but neither can completely account for the change in
behaviour of the developing countries.
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c. The Impact of Unilateral Trade Legislation

Countries relying on the international trade system do not make
decisions based purely on economic rationale thereby discounting
political barriers to their activities. For LDCs, the reality of failing to
invoke some degree of intellectual property protection may be
retaliation by way of the closure of various markets abroad markets upon which great reliance is placed.
The most infamous accounts of aggressive unilateral pressure of
this nature have been perpetrated by the u.s. trade remedy law in
the u.s. has long provided for unilateral retaliatory action against
foreign products that are seen as violating domestic IP laws. Section
337 of the u.s. Tariff Act4 8 allows for a complete exclusion of
products from the u.s. which are found to have been produced in
such a way as to violate u.s. domestic IP laws. 49 Section 337 is often
seen as a means of extra-territorial enforcement of domestic IP law.
An even more aggressive stance is taken by the Special 301 provision
of the u.s. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act5° of 1988, which
allows for trade sanctions to be imposed against countries
considered to be engaging in "unfair" trade practices, which
includes inadequate IP protection. Section 301 does not establish a
set of norms by which standards of adequate IP protection are
established. Consequently, it provides for very broad discretion.
The countries named to date under Special 301 have included
Japan, Brazil, and India.5 1
In 1989, for example, the u.s. imposed tariffs of 100 per cent
on a wide range of Brazilian products totaling $39 million in
retaliation to Brazil's failure to extend patent protection to
pharmaceuticals.52 Another provision of u.s. law, contained in the

48

Trade and TariffAct of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948.

49 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8 at 259.
50 Omnibus. Trade Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (to be
codified at 42 use 5403). Section 1 lOl(b)(lO) sets forth u.s. negotiating
objectives regarding intellectual property, while section 1303 outlines procedures
for identification of countries that deny adequate protection of, or market access
for, intellectual property rights.
5 l u.s. General Accounting Office Report to Selected Congressional
Subcommittees, "Strengthening Worldwide Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights" as cited in Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8.
52 "u.s. Sets Brazilian Trade Sanctions" The Washington Post (14 November
1987) 6.
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Process Patents Amendment Act, 53 gives holders of IP rights a right
of civil action against importers of products into the u.s. that violate
these rights. Since it is often difficult to ascertain whether a product
infringes IP rights, the result of this provision is to create a "chilling
effect" whereby buyers simply avoid the products of countries with
poor reputations in maintaining IP protection. 54 The u.s. is not
alone in implementing unilateral political pressure, by way of legal
sanction, to maintain high levels of IP protection. In 1984, the
European Union enacted the "new trade policy instrument,'' which
allows the Eu to engage in trade retaliation against illicit
commercial practices that affect EU economic interests.55 The
European Commission Green Paper on Copyright notes:
[I]n the field of intellectual property, and copyright in
particular, the instrument could conceivably play a
significant role in the future, particularly as regards
countries which practice a policy of more or less active
connivance in the pirating of goods and services
developed elsewhere. 56

The u.s. has also considered the impact of joining forces with Japan
and the EU in coordinating a trade-oriented political pressure
strategy. Authors Gadbaw and Richards write:
By adopting a common policy with the EC and Japan
linking access for imports from developing countries to
improvements in the levels of intellectual property
protection provided by these countries, the developed
countries would put at stake a market two to four times
the size of the u.s. market for these developing countries'
imports. 57

The recent TRIPS agreement of the Uruguay Round
Negotiations of GATT has caused some commentators to express
uncertainty regarding the perceived ability of developed countries
to utilize trade sanctions in an effort to secure higher standards of
IP protection. Article 8 of the Agreement states that:
53

Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 102-109, 102 Stat. 1563.

54 Reichman, supra note 23.

Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8 at 261.
European Commission Green Paper on Copyright, as cited in Eberschlag,
supra note 4 at 25.
57 Ibid at 25.
55

56
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[A]ppropriate measures, provided that they are consistent
with the provisions of the Agreement, may be needed to
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders through the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology. 58

Some have argued that the provision may be used as a shield by
LDCs against unilateral trade sanctions imposed by developed
countries where the LDcs' IP standards are in conformity with the
minimal requirements of the TRIPS agreement. 59 Specifically, LDCs
could be protected from such sanctions where their standards are in
conformity with TRIPS, though still considered "unfair" by u.s.
standards. In the presence of such unilateral action, an LDC could
make a complaint in the GATTI TRIPS dispute settlement forum that
the u.s. was in violation of Article 8.

m. The Philosophical and Social Dimensions
Metal letters that enable mass printing were first invented
in 1234 AD in Korea. . . . But the idea of copyright as a
private
property
did
not
develop
simultaneously ... today's Korean authors think it
unworthy of them to make monetary profits or file
lawsuits in connection with their works. 6o

Much of the developed world extends protection to intellectual
property on the assumption that the creators or inventors of a work
or product have a natural right to the fruit of their labors. Such a
theory supports the investment of proprietary rights in the product
of one's innovation; hence the term intellectual property. What this
theory fails to note, however, is that the proprietary interpretation is

58 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(Article 7) done at Marrakech, Morocco, April 15, 1994, as reprinted in The
Results of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations - The Legal Texts
2-3 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
59 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8 at 265.
60 Y. Sik Song, "General Application and Implementation: Legal Remedies and
Implementation" (Address to the International Symposium on the New Copyright
Law - Challenge of the New Copyright Law in a Changing Environment, 22
January 1987) [unpublished].
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not universally accepted. As the words of Korean attorney Young
Sik Song61 in the above quote illustrate, the products of innovative
activity are believed by some LDCs to be the common heritage of all
and for the common benefit of all. 62 This distinct difference in
moral ideology forms a ridge between the North and South that,
unfortunately, too often goes unnoticed. It may be that a
philosophical dimension underlies much of the economic and
political rhetoric that is the focus of the international IP debate.
Without recognizing its importance, or for that matter its existence,
the movement toward a compromise is bound to grind into
deadlock.
Yet this philosophical dimension of the debate is often
exaggerated. The claims, such as those by Sik Song which are made
in consideration of the philosophical dimension are often
intertwined and confused with claims that more aptly reflect the
social dimension of this debate. Complaints of economic losses
from piracy voiced by developed countries are responded to with
claims by LDCs that imitation is the lifeblood of their development
strategies. This is not necessarily a difference of opinion that stems
from a fundamental philosophical barrier between North and
South. Rather, it is a difference of opinion that is generated from
the fact that developed countries aspire for economic productivity
and efficiency while less developed countries aspire to merely
escape their less developed status. What each side fails to recognize
is that the aspirations of the other are distinctly different from their
own. As mentioned at the outset of this paper, the policy choices
which delineate the extent of each regime of intellectual property
reflect what intellectual activities a society values and what activities
it sees as worthy of protection. These values are, in turn, shaped by
the aspirations of a country. Consequently, the framework for IP
protection in each country will vary to reflect policy choices that are
made in light of the aspirations of that country. 63 These aspirations

Song, supra note 60.
Braga, supra note 42.
63 P. Goldstein, Remarks (1989) 22 Vand.J. Transnat'l L. 363. Goldstein uses the
copyright regime as an example of the fact that a country will shape its IP policies in
response to its economic, political, social, moral, and cultural aspirations. The u.s.
Copyright Act, 17 uscA. 8101 et. seq., for example, lays our the exclusive rights that
attach to copyrighted subject matter and then trims these rights to respond to
particular needs in the country. Exemptions such as photocopying for library or
6!
62

THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE

97

are not necessarily bound by moral considerations. Rather, they
have social connotations and are linked to a country's
developmental needs.
It is at this point that the philosophical dimension of the debate
embraces the social dimension. Earlier, it was recognized that one
of the competing interests to be balanced in justifying an economic
rationale for IP protection was the social benefit of an innovation.
The pharmaceutical industry was used as an example, noting that a
balance needed to be struck between the potential social benefit of
the free exchange of knowledge and the benefit of an increased
incentive to innovate resulting from stronger IP protection.
To this equation we may now add another variable; that of
reward for the expenditure of labour that has resulted in the
creation of a socially desirable product. For a developed country,
the scales may tilt more in favour of a protectionist strategy, while
for an LDC, the balance may be found somewhere closer to an open
policy conducive to spreading the benefit of a creation with socially
beneficial potential among all. For an LDC, the addition of this new
variable, that of reward, is not in line with its aspirations. It makes
little moral sense, from the point of view of a country struggling to
enhance the standard of living of its citizens, to withhold the
benefits of a socially beneficial product for the sake of rewarding its
creator. This point of view is exemplified by the attitude of the
Brazilian Government, which approaches intellectual property rights
in the context of Brazil's overall program for economic
development. Gadbaw and Richards point out that:
To the Brazilian government, industrial property is
viewed primarily as a technology transfer issue. In
striking a balance between providing protection for
industrial property rights and making technology
available to Brazilian firms at the lowest possible cost and
with minimum restrictions on its use, the Government of
Brazil has, since 1945, placed far more emphasis on the
latter. 64

archival purposes and the fair dealing defense are responses to economic aspirations
of the country and the interest in promoting scholarship and research. An LDc's
aspirations are tied to escaping its lesser developed status. As such, its IP policies will
reflect these aspirations by exclusions or limits on protections.
64 Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 7 at 150.
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This philosophical and social barrier between the interests of the
North and South is well illustrated within the regime of copyright
protection, and in particular, the protection of copyright in
educational materials. It is well recognized that to overcome
economic backwardness, LDCs must, to some extent, focus on
eliminating illiteracy and enhancing cultural development.
However, the establishment of a well-designed educational system
is dependent upon a supply of books. For the countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America a state of "book hunger" is often seen as
standing in the way of economic progress. 65 The importation and
reproduction of printed educational materials is thus imperative in
LDCS. However, copyright protection, and the payment of royalties
to foreign authors, inevitably makes this a difficult task. The cost of
a legitimate textbook, after all royalties, licenses, or repatriation of
profits are accounted for, is approximately $30 (u.s.). The same
textbook in its pirated version can cost as little as $6 (u.s.). 66 Under
the initiative of LDCs, a special Protocol including definite, though
minimal, allowances regarding the usage of protected works for
educational or scientific purposes, was accepted at the Stockholm
Diplomatic Convention of 1967. The Protocol was, however,
blocked by developed countries, largely due to the campaigns
against ratification led by large publishing enterprises, and the
measures outlined in it were never implemented to their full
extent. 67 While licensing schemes are used today to allow for less
expensive means of distributing educational materials in LDCs, they
are usually temporary in nature, permissible only until the
publishers themselves are able to establish themselves in the
country. 68 What is apparent, in any case, is that the attitude of
developed countries toward the needs of countries on the road to
development is too often one of indifference or, at most,
perfunctory sympathy. This attitude itself stems from the different

65

M.M. Boguslavsky, Copyright in International Relations: International
Protection of Literary and Scientific Works (Milsons Point: Edwards and Shaw Pty.
Ltd., 1979).
66 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 101. See also R. Gomez, "Leading Publishers
Launch Crackdown on Book Piracy," Reuters North European Service, (13
October 1984).
67 Boguslavsky, supra note 65.
68 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 100.
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aspirations of developed countries as compared to those of the
LDCs. As one critic has proposed,
[Any] ... standard or set of standards applied ... will
have to be a standard that incorporates balances ... [and]
the balance employed will not be a uniquely American
balance. There is no reason for it to be a uniquely
American balance because there is no reason to believe
that any other country has the same societal, cultural,
moral, or economic aspirations as the United States. 69

The question, however, is whether a standard that is not uniquely
American is a realistic one to aim for. Despite the obvious need for
compromise, the developed countries and, particularly, the u.s.,
appear unwilling to recognize the special circumstances of less
developed countries.

2. A Closer Look at the Conflicting Agendas
What follows is a more detailed consideration of the most common
claims put forth by each party to the debate. The more general
description of the forces that shape the debate, as outlined above,
may be seen to be played out in these arguments and should be
kept in mind as the arguments are developed.
i. The Perspective of the Developed Countries
The claims of developed countries in favour of increased IP
protection in the international arena focus on the benefits of such
protection to the LDCs. It should be assumed that IP protection is
also seen to be critical to developed countries' ability to maintain
their competitiveness in the world marketplace.
a. Global Innovation Deterrence
The first claim made by the developed countries is founded in the
classical economic rationale for IP protection described earlier: that
increased protection leads to incentives to innovate. According to
the developed nations, the presence of free riders or imitators in the
international arena has had a detrimental effect on the world

69

Goldstein, supra note 63 at 364.
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incentive to innovate.7° While the impact may be felt in all regimes
of intellectual property, it is particularly marked in the regime of
patents. In the absence of adequate patent standards, it is suggested
that producers will refrain from making the relatively higher cost
and higher risk investments in research and development to
produce new technologies because it becomes more difficult to
recoup the cost of this investment. Less worldwide innovation,
regardless of where it is engaged in, yields fewer benefits for all,
including the LDCs.
The extent of the piracy problem, as illustrated by statistics,
make this quite clear. Sales of legitimate pharmaceuticals in
Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Taiwan amounted to $162
million, while pirate sales equaled $192 million. Smith-Kline
Beckman, a large u .s. pharmaceutical firm, produces a drug called
Tagamet which sells for approximately $1.68 per daily dose. The
drug has been copied by Thailand's Bio lab Company and marketed
in Thailand under the name Cimulcer for a cost of $.61 per daily
dose. In turn, Cimulcer competes with at least "25 generic versions
of the same drug ... which sell for as little as $.34 per daily dose."7 1
Given that the largest projected growth in pharmaceuticals sales is
expected to be in LDCs, the incentive effect to engage in research
and development to develop drugs like Tagamet is likely to be
limited by this type of appropriation. 72
Additionally, the developed countries emphasize that the
innovation-deterring impact of inadequate IP standards may have a
particularly detrimental effect on the LDCs themselves. They note
that many multinational companies would be deterred from
developing new technologies or conducting research into new uses
of existing technology that deal with problems specific to LDCs. For
example, Merck, a large pharmaceutical company which had
developed a drug used to treat worm parasites in livestock, later
discovered that the same drug may have had the potential to cure

70 A. S. Gutterman, "The North-South Debate Regarding The Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights" (1993) 28 Wake Forest L.Rev. 89 at 126.
71 Tussie, supra note 16.
72 Gutterman, supra note 70 at 126. The pharmaceutical industries of developed
countries, particularly the u.s., form perhaps the most influential private sector
groups pressing for higher universal patent standards worldwide. Gutterman notes
that their efforts are largely motivated by the extensive appropriation of patented
technology that takes place in developing countries.
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River Blindness in humans, a disease which approximately 18
million people in developing countries are afflicted with each year.
Without the patent rights to the drug, Merck would not have had
either the resources or the incentive to conduct the extensive
research and clinical trials which led to the discovery that the drug
could be used to treat one of the most crippling diseases plaguing
less developed countries.73
b. Increased Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer

LDCs themselves argue that the importation, or for that matter,
reproduction of products with high intellectual content are vital to
their development goals. In response, developed countries note that
it is unlikely that a company will have the incentive to either
transfer technology to or directly invest in LDCS which do not
maintain adequate IP standards.7 4 In a 1987 survey, seventy-five
percent of u.s. companies surveyed perceived inadequate protection
of intellectual property as a strong disincentive to license
technology to LDCs.7 5 Publishing companies also note that higher
standards of copyright protection would likely lead to greater
direct investment in publishing facilities within LDCs, allowing for
the production of educational materials critical in resolving the
characteristic "book hunger" of the Third World.7 6 Given the
advantages of low labour costs and other incentives offered by
many LDCs, it is not unreasonable to expect a significant interest in
both direct investment and technology transfer by developed
countries if IP protection were to improve. 77

73 See R. M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property and Economic Development
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). See also T. ]. Richards "Argentina" in Gadbaw &
Richards, supra note 7 at 109-146. Richards points out that it is generally
recognized in Argentina that neither multinational companies nor Argentine
national companies are carrying out research and development tailored to the
unique needs of Argentina (for example, special vaccinations for cattle). Lack of
patent protection is clearly a major reason for this, although the relatively small size
of the Argentine pharmaceutical market may be another.
74 Braga, supra note 42.
7 5 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 94. See also G. Schuman, "Economic
Development and Intellectual Property Protection in Southeast Asia," in Rushing
& Brown, eds, supra note 19 at 173.
76 Boguslavsky, supra note 65.
77 Braga, supra note 42.
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c. Stagnation ofIndigenous Innovation and the "Brain-Drain"

Developed countries also argue that the lack of IP protection leads
to reduced indigenous innovative activity.7 8 It is often contended
that the pirate industries of the LDCS foster a reliance on foreign
innovation and create a disincentive to domestic creativity. As
Brenner-Beck suggests, "this 'copy-cat' mentality in the LDCs
[destroys] these nations' ability to sustain domestic innovation and
escape their 'lesser developed' status."79 The local culture of many
LDCs is often overwhelmed with cheap imitations of foreign movies,
videos, books, and music. IP protection, it is suggested, could lead
to the development of highly profitable and entirely genuine
domestic industries. An example is provided in Indonesia, which
implemented a new copyright law in 1987. The media has
experienced an upsurge as many business groups have launched new
magazines and newspapers as a consequence. 80 Domestic literature
stimulates local cultural awareness, a factor that is considered to be
important to the development goals of a country.
Developed countries push this argument further with the claim
that, beside removing the incentive for domestic innovation,
inadequate IP protection leads to a "brain drain," as highly trained
or educated personnel actually emigrate from the LDC to more
developed countries where their innovations can be better
protected. 81 This can lead to a direct loss by means of the
emigration of personnel involved in the innovative process itself, as
well as a secondary loss, as existing direct foreign investment and
technology transfer become less efficient because of the absence of
these personnel.

ii. The Perspective of the LDCs
The claims of LDc's can be classified into two categories. The first
encompasses a set of claims which raises skepticism as to the
benefits promised by IP protection, as advanced by the developed
countries. The other notes that the short term cost of increased
protection is much too significant to ignore.
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Gutterman, supra note 70.

79 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 95.
80
81

Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 7.
Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 95.
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a. Skepticism of the Indigenous Innovation Claim
LDCs are quick to note that their comparative advantage lies in
imitative as opposed to innovative activities. Most LDCs simply lack
the technical expertise and skill required to engage in innovative
research and development. The so-called "brain drain," they argue,
is more of an anomaly than a by-product of inadequate Ip
protection. Even if qualified personnel were to remain within the
borders of an LDC because of the availability of IP protection, there
would remain insufficient resources to engage in innovation to an
extent that would be necessary to make such IP protection
beneficial to the LDC. 82 The LDCs further argue that domestic
innovation, to the extent that it exists, tends to be limited to the
ability to make incremental changes to existing technology to adapt
it to the unique requirements of their developing economies.
Increased IP protection, then, may actually hinder domestic
innovation by blocking the imitation and adaptation of technology
that is generated in developed countries. 83 In any event, there is
inconclusive evidence to attach any merit to the claim that
increased IP protection will stimulate domestic innovation. In fact,
the statistics paint a picture quite opposite. In 1983, foreigners held
90 per cent of patents awarded in LDCs with IP regimes. Inventions
by LDcs' nationals in the same year accounted for only 1 per cent of
the world patent stock. 84

b. Skepticism of the Claim ofIncreased Technology Transfers and
Direct Foreign Investment
It is important to note that there is no conclusive evidence to
suggest that increased IP standards are linked to the rate of foreign
direct investment or technology transfers. In fact, after the 1961
abolition of patent protection for pharmaceuticals in Turkey, the
amount of direct foreign investment in the pharmaceutical sector
actually increased and no appreciable decrease in technology
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D. Beier & R. W. Kastenmeier, "International Trade and Intellectual
Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality" (1989) 22 Vand.J. Transnat'l L. 285.
83
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Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 97-98. See also T. C. Creel and D. M.
Wintringham, "Patent Systems and their Role in the Technological Advance of
Developing Nations,'' (1984) 10 Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L. J. 255 at 255, 274.
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transfer resulted. 85 In light of this lack of evidence, LDCs argue that
the actual motives of multinational corporations strongly refute the
claim that LDCs may benefit from IP protection. Where Ip
protection does exist, it is claimed that the majority of
multinational corporations take out patents or copyrights within
LDCs to protect their export markets, both in the LDC itself and in
other countries. These patents and copyrights are often used to
block competition from improved goods and to restrict price
competition. 86 Less than ten percent of patents obtained in LDCs are
actually worked within the LDC. 87 Evidence shows that the foreign
patents typically become vehicles for the development of
monopolies by multinational corporations. The result, ironically, is
the development of an IP regime which actually functions counter
to the development goals of the LDC. Large import monopolies are
established, competition is restricted, and the desired increases m
foreign investment and technology transfer are not witnessed.
c. The Displacement ofPiratical Industries as a Barrier to
Development

Noting again the comparative advantage they hold in imitation as
opposed to innovation, LDCs point particularly to the benefits of
piracy to their economies. They note that imitation of imports
allows for an adaptation of products to meet the local needs and
conditions of the LDC.
For example, textbooks may be translated into local languages
and sold at a cost that is affordable to consumers. Once rooted in
the local economy, the entrepreneurial skills and machinery needed
to produce even 'copycat' products becomes refined, and a muchneeded market for exports to other countries, especially other LDCs,
develops. In this sense, piratical industries strengthen the medium
to long-term ability of LDCs to compete in the international arena. 88
In response to the claims of the developed countries that imitative
industries will not move a country forward economically, LDCs
argue that this ability to compete at an international level will allow
them to escape lesser developed status. This is not a novel
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Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 101.
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87 usrTC Study, supra note 24.
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argument. Indeed the tolerance of imitative industries in Japan
during the early stages of its economic growth is often claimed to
have set the stage for the economic strength of the country today.s9
d. Short-Term Costs are Prohibitive

point out that the cost of initiating and maintaining an IP
regime would be prohibitive, at least in the short run. A system of
IP protection would involve costs including the development of
registration processes, the implementation of judicial procedures,
and the hiring of examiners, to list a few. The result, as noted by
Alice T. Zalik, is that
LDCS

Many developing countries [would be] faced with the
prospect of spending a great deal of their resources to
provide a system of protection which, at least initially,
will be to the benefit of foreign ... rather than domestic
intellectual property owners. 90

Furthermore, the payment of royalties to holders of IP rights would
result in increased short-term costs, which, ultimately, would be
passed on to consumers in the form of higher product prices. The
argument is strengthened when the product in question has a social
benefit component to it, as illustrated by the increased costs of
textbooks and pharmaceuticals considered earlier.

V. IS A UNIVERSAL STANDARD FEASIBLE?
In light of the conflicting agendas of the North and South, 1t 1s
questionable whether a set of universal standards that will be
acceptable to all is a feasible resolution to this debate. Without one
group giving in to the demands of the other, the debate over IP
protection in the international arena may remain in a stagnant state
of unresolve. Perhaps the debate itself is focused too sharply upon a
solution which itself needs to be re-evaluated. It is submitted that
the objective should be shifted from establishing a universal
standard of protection applicable to all countries to establishing
flexible standards of protection tailored to a nation's stage of
development.
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Tussie, supra note 16.
A.T. Zalik, Remarks (1989) 22 Vand.J. Transnat'l L. 329 at 330.

106

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

1. The Multi-Lateral Conventions
To some extent, a "tailored approach by exclusion" has been the
practical result of much of the negotiation that has taken place in
the multilateral context. To date, multilateral conventions have
included broad exemptions, and in some cases, complete exclusions
from the terms of these conventions, for LDCS. For example, the
Paris Convention includes a provision which allows a member state
to refuse to offer patent protection for certain product groups,
provided that the absence of protection applies equally to nationals
and non-nationals. This permits de facto discrimination, whereby
countries that have no significant comparative advantage in the
production of certain innovations are able to exclude them from
protection.
This loophole or, in the eyes of some critics, compromise,
allows LDCs to effectively circumvent the minimal standards of the
Convention.9 1 The Berne Convention has a similar provision of
appeasement, which permits LDCs to substitute compulsory
licensing for the minimum standards of the Convention. 92 These
exemptions may be seen as reflecting a compromise on the
developed countries' end of the bargaining table, in recognition of
the unique conditions of LDCs. However, broad exemptions from
the provisions of multilateral agreements fail to deal with the crux
of the problem; the fact that most LDCs are simply not ready for
enhanced IP regimes. A more structured set of criteria by which
readiness for adherence to minimal standards of protection can be
evaluated, is required.
The most recent round of GATT, in which developed countries
attempted to link IP with trade, provides another example of the
failure to achieve a truly uniform standard of protection without
broad exceptions for LDCs as a group.9 3 The resulting TRIPS
Agreement attempts to reach a compromise between the objectives
of the developed countries and the needs of LDCs. According to
Article 7 of the Agreement,
the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights should contribute to the promotion of

9l
92
93

Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8.
Ibid at 258.
Ibid at 271.
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technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to
a balance of rights and obligations.9 4

The TRIPS agreement does not refer to the factors to be considered
in meeting this objective. Further, the Agreement also establishes a
Council which will "undertake reviews in light of any new
developments which might warrant modification or amendment of
the Agreement. " 9 5 Part II of the Agreement contains substantive
norms with respect to the protection of the various forms of
intellectual property. To a large extent, the provisions of the Paris
and Berne Conventions are integrated into the TRIPS agreement
and new forms as well as new levels of protection are provided for.96
Again, no consideration of unique country circumstances is
apparent, except for clauses which provide for a transition period of
five years to LDCs, and complete exemptions for the least developed
countries. 97 How, then, has the TRIPS agreement facilitated the
compromise between North and South? First, it has established the
objectives of a compromise. Second, it has provided the tools to
facilitate the compromise. What it has not done is provide the
instructions by which those tools may be used in constructing the
compromise.

2. The Threshold: Criteria for Constructing the Compromise
In constructing a compromise between North and South,
instructions, or criteria, which assess the unique circumstances of
each LD c need to be developed and utilized, as opposed to
considering all LDCs as a whole and applying transitional periods
and broad exemptions to them as a group. In developing such
criteria, the foundational economic rationales used to justify IP
protection in the international context must be re-examined.
It was noted at the outset that any resolution of the issue would
require a balancing of interests, both nationally and internationally.
In the context of this balancing act, it was accepted that the

94 TRIPS

Agreement, supra note 58, Article 7.

95

Ibid. at Article 68.

96

Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8 at 264.

97

Ibid.

108

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

compromise chosen would likely be one that is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient; the gains in economic welfare attributed to the benefits of
the standard chosen will be seen as outweighing the losses in welfare
that result from its costs. This state of compromise is needed
because the countries involved are at different stages of
development. Where the u.s., for example, gains from a high
standard of copyright protection because it is the world's leader in
the production of software, Brazil may suffer a loss in its domestic
software piracy industry because it has a comparative advantage in
appropriating software. However, there is a point in the stage of its
development when a country like Brazil will begin to weigh its
interests quite differently. It is at this point or stage that a certain
level of industrial infrastructure, entrepreneurial initiative, and
education sufficient to make the establishment of an intellectual
property regime beneficial to the country will be seen to exist. 98 In
essence, a shift in the comparative advantage from imitation to
innovation will be witnessed. A countty witnessing such a shift can
be said to have reached the threshold of development at which it is
in its best interest to establish an intellectual property regime.
Piracy fuels the growth and development of such a country's
development and enhances its technical capacity up to the point at
which it reaches the threshold. Then, the positive consequences of
increased protection touted by the developed countries begin to
materialize.
Various studies of LDCs conclude that a number of variables
suggest that a country has reached this level of development.99 A
complete examination of these variables would be well beyond the
scope of this paper. In a more succinct manner, the identifying
features can be classified into three categories. First, an LDC needs a
literate work force and the existence of trained scientific and
technical personnel to attract foreign investment, utilize transferred
technology, and implement and sustain domestic inventive
ability. 100 Second, a level of industrialization and industrial

98

See e.g. Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 102-3.

99 lnfta notes 100, 101, 102 & 103 and accompanying text.
JOO E. Salem (1988) 12 Far East Economic Rev. 59. Salem suggests that education
may be the most important element of the threshold and may be a key factor
holding back many wcs from reaching a developed status.
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infrastructure sufficient to support an IP regime is essential. 101
Thirdly, base levels of domestic capital mobilization rates and levels
of entrepreneurship must be in existence. 102 These factors enable
domestic enterprises to participate in and gain from the incentives
provided by IP protection.

3. Do the Threshold Criteria Mitigate the Barriers?
Earlier in this paper, the economic, political, philosophical and
social forces that shape the IP debate were examined. If each of
these forces are considered, this time in light of the threshold
criteria outlined above, the barriers they impose upon an effective
resolution of the debate appear to be mitigated.
i. The Economic Dimension

Consideration of the threshold criteria would allow for a more
economically efficient resolution to the debate. Each country
involved would have more to gain and less to lose from the
implementation of an IP regime. Essentially, such an approach
would guarantee a higher level of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency; the gains
would outweigh the losses to a greater extent. This approach also
respects the principle of comparative advantage by allowing IP
regimes to develop when the LDC shifts its comparative advantage
from imitation to innovation, a shift that makes such a regime is in
the best interest of the LDC.
ii. The Political Dimension

As noted earlier, the decision to reject or establish an IP regime is
not made solely on economic grounds without consideration of
potential political implications it may have. Political pressure aimed
at LDCs to procure adequate protective standards could, using the

101 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 104 suggests that "[i]ndicators of this
industrialization include the overall annual growth rates in GNP, the annual growth
rates in industry and manufacturing secrors, per capita energy consumption, and
annual energy production." See also J. Maclaughlin et al., "The Economic
Significance of Piracy" as cited in Gadbaw and Richards, supra note 7.
Maclaughlin notes that increased growth rates of only .07 per cent to .2 per cent
were needed to offset the short-term costs of eliminating piracy.
102 See Brenner-Beck, ibid. at 104 where he notes that this element may be
reflected by domestic investment and savings rates.

110

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

threshold criteria, continue to play a significant role. One recent
study identified certain nations which appear to have reached the
threshold but which do not maintain levels of IP protection
expected from their level of economic development. 10 3 Political
pressure sufficient to initiate action on behalf of these "out of
phase" nations may be suitably called for.
In most cases, however, the required political pressure will be
generated internally. In Taiwan, for example, private sector interest
groups became actively involved during the consideration of
implementing stronger copyright, patent and trademark laws. Acer,
a Taiwanese company that produces computer hardware, is one
such example. It was responsible for the introduction of the Intel
microprocessor to Taiwan in 1975. Improved patent protection was
called for by Acer and other Taiwanese companies in the fear that
domestic industries were suffering from lax protections. Taiwan
increased its copyright protection in 1985 and 1989, and its patent
protection in 1985. Consequently, Acer has moved into the
production of computers developed by its own in-house research
and development staff. Notably, Chase Manhattan Bank recently
invested u.s. $1.4 million in Acer and Texas Instruments has
entered into a joint venture with the company to produce
semiconductors. 104 What is evident from this example is that the
call for increased protection comes from within a country and is
supported as being in the best interest of a country when it has
reached the threshold level of development. As such, external
political pressure assumes a less essential, albeit important, role as a
persuasive force for the adoption of higher IP standards.

iii. The Philosophical Dimension
Fram a philosophical viewpoint, LDCs were said to have accepted an
ideological perspective distinct from the developed countries'
perception of intellectual property. However, this philosophical
perspective was intimately linked to the LDCS social, cultural, and
moral aspirations. In other words, while the ideological conception

I03 R.T. Rapp & R.P. Rozek, "Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries" (1990) 24 J. of World Trade 75 at 81. Rapp
& Rozek identify the countries of Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, and
Mexico as potential beneficiaries of intellectual property protection.
104 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 113.
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of attaching property rights to products of the mind may be novel
to LDCs, it is novel primarily because the conception runs counter to
their development objectives rather than because of any inherent
moral objection to the concept in and of itself.
For example, it was seen that, for a less developed country, it
made no sense to reward an innovator for the fruits of his or her
labour when the consequence of doing so would be to restrict the
dissemination of a useful invention or creative work that would help
the country escape its lesser developed status. These aspirations
gradually transform as a country reaches the threshold level of
development. At this point, levels of education become
commensurate to those of developed countries. Per capita GNP is
high enough for citizens to purchase goods at prices comparable to
those of developed countries. Industrial infrastructures and local
entrepreneurialism have developed to the stage at which piratical
industries are replaced with innovative industries which are
themselves reliant on IP protection. While the social benefit of an
innovation continues to be seen as an important interest to balance,
the scale may tilt more in favour of increasing incentives to innovate
and rewarding the fruits of labour. This shift in perspective is due
largely to the fact that the development goals of the country, to
which its aspirations are geared, have been met to a large extent
once it reaches the threshold. Its aspirations, at the threshold,
change from sustenance to prospering economically and
competitively in a global marketplace. 10 5 The latter inherently calls
for increased IP protection.
4. Singapore's New Copyright Act as a Case Study
A study of Singapore's passage of and reaction to a change in its
Copyright Act demonstrates the effect of increased IP protection
when implemented by a country that has reached its threshold level
of development. In the mid 1980s, of all the nations identified as a
105 See generally, Braga supra note 42. Braga appears to accept the significance of
the philosophical dimension to the IP conflict, particularly noting that the history
of the evolution of national patent systems suggests that 'economic expediency'
dominates legal and moral considerations. Where it is in the best interest of a
country to embrace an IP regime, it will have the natural incentive to do so. This
theme is supported by the approach of Goldstein, supra note 63 at 36 where he notes
that a country's IP policy will reflect its societal, cultural, moral and economic
aspirations.
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threat to developed countries because of high levels of piracy and
counterfeiting, Singapore was the most likely candidate for having
passed the threshold. A small industrialized city-state, by 1988
Singapore's per capita GNP had risen to $9,070. It had a highly
skilled and educated population and, as an important international
shipping point, its economy was highly dependent on foreign
trade. 106 Yet its copyright law was the subject of much criticism,
both from within and outside Singapore. In particular, there were
complaints of weak enforcement efforts, minor penalties,
discrimination against foreign authors, and lack of protection for
consumer software. 10 7 In effect, the state of Singapore's copyright
law was comparable to that of several other countries that are today
at or on the verge of the threshold level of development. 108
In the early 1980s, Singapore was considered the world capital
of piracy. Imitations of pirate music tapes alone was estimated to be
an industry worth over $100 million (u.s.) annually. 10 9 The u .s.
government played a leading role during this period in encouraging
Singapore to reform its intellectual property regime.
Early in 1982, representatives from the u.s. regularly visited
Singapore in order to encourage the reform of its copyright laws. 110
In 1984, an amendment to the US. Trade and TariffAct1 11 allowed
u.s. negotiators to threaten the loss of GSP benefits, covering $730
million of Singapore's exports in 1985, if the piracy situation did
not improve. At around the same time as this u.s. pressure was
invoked, the Singapore government itself implemented a strategy
aimed at "supporting native creativity, encouraging foreign
investment in technology, and transforming Singapore into a brain
services center for exporting technological goods. " 112 This internal

See e.g. Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 7 at 311-340.
See ibid. for a detailed analysis of the structure of the old and new laws and
their major differences, as well as a critique of the old regime.
108 See Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 107. Brenner-Beck compares the state of
Singapore's copyright regime, prior to its reform, to Malaysia, Taiwan, and
Indonesia.
109 Ibid
110 Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 7 at 339.
111 Ibid
112 See E. A Friedheim, "Singapore's New Copyright Law: Turning Pirates into
Discounters?" (1988) 2 Software L.J. 203, 205 as cited in Brenner-Beck, supra note
12 at 107.
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policy measure was motivated by interest groups which advocated
increased protection within Singapore. Virtually all organizations
which took a public position on the adoption of a new Copyright
Act were supportive of increasing protection. Among organizations
representing Singaporean companies, strong support was provided
by the Singapore Phonogram and Videogram Association and the
Singapore Book Publishers Association. The Consumers'
Association of Singapore, in a written submission, stated:
With more stringent legislation to curb piracy, local
authors will be encouraged to produce creative works.
More foreign works may find their way to Singapore
since foreign authors and publishers will be assured that
their works will be adequately protected. In the long-run,
the Copyright Bill 1986 will benefit the Singapore
consumer. 113

It is apparent that both u.s. trade pressure and changing economic
aspirations that emanated from within the country, encouraged
Singapore to pass new copyright legislation in 1987.
The new Copyright Act has been hailed as transforming
Singapore's domestic audio cassette/record, video, and
entertainment industries. The number of licenses sold to
Singapore's video dealers by overseas copyright owners
increased dramatically, resulting in increased profits for
the dealers. Sales of legitimate records and cassettes
doubled. Former cassette tape and video pirates became
legitimate producers of blank cassettes and repair parts.
Music companies began to promote Singaporean singers,
and started using local studio engineers, songwriters, and
producers. The local film and video industry [came to
life as it] was no longer possible to obtain copies of
recently released movies from pirates. 11 4

Prior to the passage of the Act, Microsoft had estimated that over
ninety percent of its software packages sold in Singapore and
Malaysia were pirate copies. The new Copyright Act included
protection for computer software. Consequently, sales and
113 Report of the Select Committee on the Copyright Bill, A87, as cited in
Gadbaw & Richards, supra note 7 at 319.
114 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 108.
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investment by foreign computer and software manufacturers has
increased. In fact, Singapore has been called a second "Silicon
Valley." 11 5
The results of the Act have not been positive in all respects,
however. The success stories often understate the fact that many of
the pirates have simply gone underground. Much of the piracy has
been transferred to Malaysia, supplying Singaporean consumers
from across the border. 116 Video pirates are estimated to still
control twenty percent of the market (compared to eighty-five
percent before the Act was passed). 11 7 Also, "music pirates have
engaged in the counterfeit production of blank tapes." 118 While the
bulk of copyright infringement has been eradicated, trademark
infringement continues in the production of perfumes, liquors, and
watches. 119 Despite these inconsistencies, however, the passage and
vigorous implementation of the new Copyright Act in Singapore has
been a resounding success.
Singapore, like several other countries which are approaching or
have passed the threshold level of development, was ready for
change. It embraced a regime of copyright protection that was
suited to its internal needs. While trade pressure played an
important role in initiating change, it was the internal recognition
that a new Copyright Act would benefit domestic industries and
consumer welfare that was the driving force behind such change.
5. The Threshold Countries: Evidence of Success with
Protection
Studies have suggested that a number of countries such as Mexico,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan have reached or are
approaching the threshold level of development, 120 and have been
characterized as upper middle, or high income, economies. Each
has per capita GNP levels far above the subsistence level and at least
twice that of the average LDC. Literacy levels have surpassed seventy
per cent, and all have a domestic scientific/technical capacity
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sufficient to experience industrial growth and capital formation.121
Notably, all have been significant pirate nations, and continue, to
some extent, to currently engage in piracy. Today, each of these
countries has implemented some degree of IP protection. The
successes of these regimes brings some support to the claims of the
developed countries. That is to say, at the threshold level of
development, enhanced IP protection may result in significant
economic benefits to countries which engage in piracy.
Malaysia recently amended its Copyright Act to provide
increased protection, and joined the Berne Convention in 1990.
"Search," a new Malaysian rock band which has innovated a new
style of Malaysian rock music, has been very successful in the
country. The new style of music has captured a large following and
has resulted in a quadrupling of both the number of record
companies and the number of rock bands in Malaysia. Exports of
music cassettes within the Asian market have also increased
significantly as a consequence.122
In 1987 and again in 1990, Korea revamped its patent laws to
provide for greater protection. In response, a significant rise in the
number of domestic patent applications has been witnessed. There
have also been reports of a "reverse brain drain" whereby Korean
scientists have returned to Korea to pursue research careers. 12 3
Furthermore, Korean export printing revenues rose 41 per cent after
the passage of a stronger copyright law in 1987. 124
Hong Kong also passed new and stronger copyright legislation
in 1978. Consequently, local recordings accounted for 70 per cent
of record sales. The country's film industry is the third largest in
the world. Its reliance on foreign sales, particularly to other Asian
markets, in conjunction with strict copyright laws, has led to
substantial revenues. 12 5
The success of one Taiwanese company, Acer, was highlighted
earlier as a consequence of enhanced copyright legislation. The
increased research and development activity undertaken by

121 Supra, note 12.
122

F. Pearce, "Asian Sales a Boost to u.s. Manufacturers" (1988) 41 Far East
Economic Rev. 66.
123 Sherwood, supra note 73 as cited in Benner-Beck, supra note 12 at 112..
124 Brenner-Beck, supra note 12 at 112.
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Taiwan's new high technology industries have also resulted in a
"reverse brain-drain" phenomenon, similar to that in Korea, as
Taiwanese engineers and scientists have encountered new researchrelated job opportunities.

VI. Is THE THRESHOLD APPROACH FEASIBLE?
The success stories suggest that the answer to this question should
indeed be a resounding 'yes.' There remain, however, some
unanswered questions as to the practical applicability of such an
approach. In what forum will it be considered, and how will it be
implemented? Perhaps more importantly, how will developed
countries react to the use of threshold criteria?
1. The Forum of Negotiation: Bilateral or Multilateral?

While the threshold approach recognizes that the impetus for
change must stem from within a country, it is unclear how the
standards of protection will be decided. The case study of
Singapore may be seen as an example. The context of negotiation in
that case was bilateral in nature. It was the u.s. that engaged in the
political tactics as well as friendly consultations that spearheaded
the movement toward copyright reform in Singapore. 126 However,
the bilateral negotiations between Singapore and the u.s. took place
prior to the signing of the GATT/TRIPS Agreement 127 in 1994. Under
the Agreement, a multilateral forum has been established to work
toward the promotion of standards of IP protection that are
mutually acceptable to both developed countries and LDCs. To
debate the appropriateness of this forum would be rather moot at
this point, for it is unlikely that the TRIPS agreement will be severed
from the mandate of the WTO any time in the near future. Efforts
of the LDCs to re-direct intellectual property toward the WIPO
forum, where they would be detached from trade considerations,
have clearly failed. If the issue is to be addressed in a multilateral
forum, it will likely be done so within the WTO and TRIPS
Agreement.
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2. A Proposal: The "Sliding Scale" of Protection
The TRIPS agreement provides the tools for reaching a compromise,
but fails to include the instructions. The threshold criteria, it is
submitted, could and should serve as the instructions. A
"progressive" or "sliding scale" approach toward IP protection
should be implemented. The sliding scale would demarcate various
regimes of IP protection and various industries to which those
regimes would apply. An LDC would be expected to establish
specific regimes of intellectual property in specific industries when
and where this would be suited to its stage of development. 12 8
Instead of wholesale exemptions from standards, less restrictive
minimum standards would apply to the least developed countries,
and these standards would be gradually phased-out and upgraded
as the nation develops and is able to sustain higher levels of
protection without adverse consequences. However, once a country
reaches its threshold level of development, it would be required to
adopt the minimal standards outlined in the TRIPS Agreement,
which would essentially serve as the upper-end of the sliding scale.
The Council to administer the TRIPS Agreement would be
allocated the task of periodically reviewing the status of LDCs and
their respective position on the sliding scale of protection. In
making their assessment, the threshold criteria should play a vital
role.
The proposal outlined above, which functions in the multilateral
context, does not preclude the use of complementary and
conjunctive bilateral negotiations, as was illustrated by the case
study of Singapore. Indeed nothing in the TRIPS Agreement would
prevent the use of bilateral negotiations or even unilateral trade
measures, as long as they conform with the provisions of GA TT
itself. 129
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Note that the proposed scheme allows for gradual adherence to IP standards
not only by regime of protection, but also by industry. For example, a threshold
country may be seen to be ready for extensive patent protection, but not for
copyright protection in all industries. Its copyright regime would thus be altered to
allow for higher standards of protection for audio cassettes and film, for example,
but protections for textbooks and other educational materials might continue to
remain as they were.
129 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 8.
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3. Reluctance of the Developed Countries

Use of a sliding-scale, and the threshold criteria to implement it,
precludes the establishment of a universal standard of IP protection
among all countries. In doing so, it may lead to standards of
protection that are not adequate to prevent the damaging effects of
piracy and counterfeiting in countries which have the worst
reputations for these activities. It may be difficult for developed
countries, particularly the u.s., to accept such a compromise.
However, a fair argument may be made to suggest that the degree
of protection espoused by the sliding scale may be greater than the
degree of protection under the existing TRIPS agreement, given the
exclusions that TRIPS currently allows for some of the least
developed countries. Essentially, LDCs will be required to comply
with lower standards as opposed to being excluded altogether.
Furthermore, the sliding scale would ensure that these same
countries would be required to comply with higher standards as
they develop, by means of the explicit criteria that would be used
to administer their progress. This prevents countries from adhering
to levels of IP protection that are seen as out of phase with the state
of their development and would lead to continual increases in
protection even before the threshold is reached, a situation that is
unlikely under the more static TRIPS agreement as it stands to date.
Despite its advantages, the proposal clearly calls for a good faith
compromise on behalf of developed countries, particularly the u.s ..
Whether they will acquiesce to such a compromise is
indeterminable. It may validly be argued that the developed
countries have gained too much in the Uruguay Round to succumb
to the demands of a compromise more favorable to the LDCs at this
point.13° However, while the TRIPS agreement was included in the
Final Act of the Uruguay Round, it should not be interpreted as a
final resolution to the IP debate. Further negotiation and
refinement of the compromise reached in the TRIPS Agreement is
foreseeable in the future. And as J. H. Reichman notes, the
compromise will depend upon "good faith negotiation and
cooperation between states, in a manner that takes into account the
interests of the developed countries without prejudicing the
l30 J.H. Reichman, "Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement" (1995) 29 The
International Lawyer 345.
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interests of developing countries." 131 The implementation of TRIPS,
and a review of its substantive content, is a key issue. 132 It is the
author's contention that the nature of the compromise reached in
the Agreement should be re-evaluated at that time.

VII. CONCLUSION
Necessity may be the mother of invention, but it is not
often recognized that economic growth is invention's
child. 133

Brenner-Beck's words are an eloquent testimonial to the fact that a
resolution to this debate will require an empathetic compromise
and mutual concessions. The beliefs, needs, and aspirations of less
developed countries stand in stark contrast to those of LDCs. To
impose upon these LDCs a set of ideals that are ill-suited to their
economic reality is inefficient and unrealistic.
The North-South IP debate unfolds in an environment of
tension, and these tensions will not easily be tempered. It is the
author's submission that the debate itself needs to be redefined if
these tensions are to be mitigated. The push for a universal standard
of protection by developed countries should be re-thought and reformulated to take into consideration each LDC's unique
circumstances. A tailored approach, in which a country's intrinsic
readiness for an IP regime is considered, is best able to meet this
objective. Such an approach is feasible within the framework of the
existing TRIPS Agreement. Acceptance of the threshold approach
will not come easily. It is clear that developed countries, in
particular, will have hesitations. Negotiation, persuasion, and to
some extent, reflection on the failures of the past, will be required
before a common consensus, and hence a resolution to this debate,
is achieved.
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